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Abstract 
 
We estimate reference CO2 emission projections in the European Union, and quantify the economic impacts of the 
Kyoto commitment on Member States. We consider the case where each EU member individually meets a CO2 
emissions target, applying a country-wide cap and trade system to meet the target but without trade among countries. 
We use a version of the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, here disaggregated to 
separately include 9 European Community countries and commercial and household transportation sectors. We 
compare our results with that of four energy-economic models that have provided detailed analyses of European 
climate change policy. In the absence of specific additional climate policy measures, the EPPA reference projections 
of carbon emissions increase by 14% from 1990 levels. The EU-wide target under the Kyoto Protocol to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change is a reduction in emissions to 8% below 1990 levels. EPPA emissions 
projections are similar to other recent modeling results but there are underlying differences in energy and carbon 
intensities among the projections. If EU countries were to individually meet the EU allocation of the Community-
wide carbon cap specified in the Kyoto Protocol, we find using EPPA that carbon prices vary from $91 in the United 
Kingdom to $385 in Denmark; welfare costs range from 0.6 to 5%. 
 
Keyword(s):  Global change; CO2 emissions; Abatement costs; Kyoto Protocol; European Union; Computable 
general equilibrium model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
At the Third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Annex B1 Parties committed to reducing, either 
individually or jointly, their total emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHGs) by at least 5 percent 
within the period 2008 to 2012, relative to these gases 1990 levels. 
The European Union (EU) is a full Party to the UNFCCC and a signatory of the Kyoto 
Protocol, and has accepted a quantitative absolute reduction of 8 percent of its GHG emissions. 
Article 4 of the Protocol allows the EU to allocate its target among the Member States. A 
political agreement on that redistribution was reached at the environmental Council meeting on 
June 1998, and is referred to as the Burden Sharing Agreement (BSA). 
The Kyoto Protocol allows Annex B Parties to meet their commitments by three flexible 
mechanisms (emission trading, clean development mechanism, and Joint Implementation) in 
order to reduce the economic cost of emissions reductions. Flexible mechanisms could be 
implemented at the European level: in March 2000, the European Commission prepared a 
Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union that proposes to 
introduce in 2005 an EU trading system that would be integrated into the international trading 
system in 2008 (Viguier, 2000). They could also be implemented at national level: e.g., 
emissions trading systems are in the process of being established in Norway, the United 
Kingdom, and Denmark; and other countries, namely, Sweden, France, and most recently 
Germany, have advanced proposals or announced intentions to include emissions trading systems 
as part of their plans for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (Ellerman, 2000). 
The primary objective of this paper is to develop a version of the MIT Emissions Prediction 
and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model and a reference emissions projection to study the economic 
impacts of restricting CO2 emissions in the European Union. As reference emissions growth is an 
important factor in estimating the costs of meeting an emissions target, we make a detailed 
comparison of trends in energy intensities, economic growth, emissions profiles, and abatement 
costs curves in EPPA with those resulting from other models that are popular in the climate 
change policy discussions in Europe. The other models we consider in this paper are POLES-
IEPE, PRIMES-NTUA, WEPS-EIA, and GTEM-ABARE. Such a comparison is important for 
understanding the differences in the economic impacts of Kyoto on Annex B regions produced 
by these models. In section 2, we provide a brief description of the new version of the EPPA 
model developed for this analysis (EPPA-EU) including 9 EU countries and the addition of a 
transportation sector in households and in industry for each of these countries.  We also briefly 
describe the other models chosen for the comparison. In section 3, we present the emission 
reference projected for European countries in the EPPA model, and compare it with reference 
cases in the other models. In section 4, we consider the economic impact for European countries 
of implementing the Kyoto target, and the Burden Sharing Agreement, without flexibility 
mechanisms. Marginal abatement cost curves and domestic carbon price estimates are compared 
                                                 
1 Annex B refers to the group of developed countries comprising of OECD (as defined in 1990), Russia and the East 
European Associates. 
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in this section with the other economic models. Finally, section 5 draws conclusions from our 
findings. 
 
 
2. THE EPPA-EU MODEL 
 
The Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model is a recursive dynamic multi-
regional general equilibrium model of the world economy that has been developed for analysis of 
climate change policy (Babiker et al., 2000a, Babiker et al., 2000b, Babiker et al., 2000c, 
Ellerman and Wing, 2000, Babiker and Eckaus, 2000, and Babiker and Jacoby, 1999). Previous 
versions of the model have been used extensively for this purpose (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1997; 
Ellerman and Decaux, 1998; Jacoby and Sue Wing, 1999; and Reilly et al., 1999). 
The current version of EPPA is built on a comprehensive energy-economy data set (GTAP4-
E2) that accommodates a consistent representation of energy markets in physical units as well as 
detailed accounts of regional production and bilateral trade flows. The base year for the model is 
1995 and it is solved recursively at 5-year intervals. A full documentation of the current version 
of EPPA is provided in Babiker et al., 2000d. 
 
2.1. EU Disaggregation 
 
EPPA-EU extended the current version of EPPA by bringing in a detailed breakdown of the 
EU and incorporating an industry and a household transport sectors for each region. The 
regional, sectoral, and factors aggregation shown in Table 1, together with the substitution 
elasticities in Table 2 completely specify the benchmark equilibrium. 
The European Union is disaggregated into 9 countries and 1 region representing the Rest of 
Europe (ROE). Four out of the 9 EU countries (France, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands) were 
aggregated together with ROE in the GTAP4-E database. 
We disaggregated this region using data from the GTAP-5 Pre-release that provides a 
complete disaggregation of the EU.3 To accomplish this task we developed an optimization 
algorithm that uses the economic structure of these 4 countries in GTAP-5 Pre-release while 
imposing the output, demand, and trade balances for their corresponding aggregate region in 
GTAP4-E. This allowed us to leave unchanged all other regions of the standard EPPA based on 
GTAP4-E. 
 
                                                 
2 For description of the GTAP database see Hertel, 1997. 
3 Though GTAP-5 Pre-release has all 9 of these countries broken out we chose to focus on disaggregating only the 4 
largest of these countries. 
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Table 1. Dimensions of the EPPA-EU model 
Production Sectors Name Countries and Regions Name 
Non-Energy  Annex B  
1. Agriculture AG United States USA 
2. Energy-Intensive Industries EINT Japan JPN 
3. Other Industries and Services OIND Europe EEC 
4. Transportation TRAN Denmark DNK 
Energy  Finland FIN 
5. Crude Oil OIL France FR 
6. Natural Gas GAS Germany DEU 
7. Refined Oil REFOIL Italy ITA 
8. Coal COAL Netherlands NLD 
9. Electricity ELEC Spain ESP 
Future Energy Supply  Sweden SWE 
10. Carbon Liquids  United Kingdom GBR 
11. Carbon-Free Electric  Rest of Europea ROE 
  Other OECD OOE 
Households (Consumers) Sector H Former Soviet Union FSU 
  Central European Associates EET 
Primary Factors  Non-Annex B  
1. Labor L Brazil BRA 
2. Capital C China CHN 
3. Fixed Factors for Fuel  India IND 
and Agriculture  Energy Exporting Countries EEX 
  Dynamic Asian Economies DAE 
  Rest of World ROW 
Notes: a Includes Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, and Portugal. 
 
 
Table 2. EPPA-EU Model Default Parameters 
Parameter Description Value Comments 
σERVA Elasticity of substitution between energy 
resource composite and value-added 
0.6 Agriculture only 
σER Substitution between land and energy-
material bundle 
0.6 Agriculture 
σAE Substitution between energy and material 
composite 
0.3 Agriculture 
σVA Substitution between labor & capital 1 All sectors except nuclear in which is 0.5 
σENOE Substitution between electric and non 
electric energy 
0.5 All sectors 
σEN Substitution among non-electric energy 1 All sectors except for electricity where coal and oil generation substitute 
at 0.3 among themselves and at 1 with gas 
σGR Substitution between fixed factor and the 
rest of inputs 
0.6 All sectors that have fixed resource, except nuclear generation where it is 
calibrated to match exogenous supply elasticity 
σEVA Substitution between energy and value 
added composite 
0.4 For all sectors except energy intensive and other industry where it is 0.5 
σDM Armington substitution between domestic 
and imports 
3 All goods except Electricity where it is 0.3 
σMM Armington substitution across imports 5.0 
4.0 
Non-energy goods 
Energy goods, except refined oil (6) and electricity (0.5) 
σCS Temporal substitution between 
consumption and saving 
1 Final demand sector 
σC Substitution across consumption goods  Varies across countries and is updated with income recursively to reflect 
income elasticities based on an econometrically estimated equation 
G0 Labor supply annual growth rate in 
efficiency units 
2% 
2.5-
6% 
For developed countries and converges to 1 by 2100 
For developing countries and converges to 1.5% by 2100 
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2.2. Transportation Sector Disaggregation 
 
The other change in this version of the model is the disaggregation of the transportation 
sector. With transportation disaggregated, there are now nine output sectors for each of the 22 
regions in EPPA-EU, as shown in the left-hand column of table 1. The EPPA model also 
includes future or backstop sources of fuels and electricity, but they do not play a significant 
role in this analysis which looks only out to 2020. Eight of the production sectors follow the 
standard EPPA definitions. The ninth, transportation (denoted TRAN), has been added by this 
study. The GTAP database does not include a separate transportation sector within industry, nor 
does it contain a separate category for private automobile services in the household sector. We 
followed the methodology developed by Babiker et al., 2000c for the United States to break out 
transportation from EPPAs OTHERIND sector and to create a household supplied 
transportation sector (i.e. private automobiles) in the EU. 
The basic approach for the TRANS sectors is to use GTAPs trade and transport sector that 
combines transport with trade margins in combination with data from Input-Output tables 
produced by the European statistical office (Eurostat). These tables provide the data to 
disaggregate trade margins from transportation for each European country. For the other regions 
in the model, we used the US input-output coefficients from Babiker et al., 2000c study. The 
TRANS industry supplies transportation services (both passenger and freight) to other sectors 
and to households. The structure of the transportation industry sector is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Structure of Production Sector for the Industry Transportation Sector 
Domestic Output 
AGRIC ENERINT OTHERIND Energy-Labor-Capital Bundle 
Domestic Imports Energy Aggregate Value Added 
ELEC Non-Elec L K 
Regions: 1  n 
COAL OIL GAS REFOIL 
σDM σEVA 
σVA σENOE 
σEN 
σMM 
  
 
 
 
We have also made adjustments directly to the Household (H) sector to represent own-
supplied transportation services, primarily that provided by personal automobiles. Households 
produce transportation services for their own consumption using inputs from the Other Industry 
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Products (OIND) and Refined Oil sectors. Consumption expenditure of private households 
reported by Eurostat (1999) and energy statistics from the International Energy Agency (IEA, 
1998a; IEA, 1998b; IEA, 2000) along with the coefficients reported in the Babiker et al., 2000c 
study were used to separate the household purchases that are part of household production of 
transportation from other household purchases. 
The new breakout yields a sector of own-supplied personal transportation (private 
automobiles) separate from other household activities, and a separate transportation sector in 
industry that supplies transport services to both industry (i.e., freight transportation and any 
passenger transportation purchased by business) and households (purchased transportation 
service, mainly passenger transportation services such as air and rail service). Services from 
private automobiles involve inputs from OIND that include the automobile itself, repairs, 
insurance, parking, and vehicle fuel from the REFOIL sector. The procedure involves allocating 
OIND and REFOIL output between direct uses in the household. The structure of personal 
transportation services within the household sector is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Structure of Household Sector with Transportation 
 Consumer
Utility 
Aggregate 
Consumption 
Savings 
Consumption 
IND, 1-6* OTHER 
IND, H 
REFOIL, 
H 
TRANSPORT, H
PRIVATE
AUTOS 
TRANSPORT
OTHER 
IND, PA 
REFOIL, 
PA 
σCS 
σ = 1 
σC 
σDM 
σ = 0 
σ = 0.5 
* AG, EINT, OIL, GAS, COAL, ELEC 
Regions: 1  n 
σMM 
Domestic Imports 
 
 
 
3. OTHER ECONOMIC MODELS 
 
We compare the EPPA-MIT reference for Europe with reference projections of 4 other 
models: POLES-IEPE, PRIMES-NTUA, WEPS-EIA, and GTEM-ABARE. 
The POLES model, developed at IEPE (Institut dEconomie et de Politique de lEnergie-
CNRS), is a global partial equilibrium model of the world energy system with 30 regions. 
POLES can produce detailed world energy and CO2 emission projections by region through the 
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year 2030. POLES combines some features of top-down models in that prices play a key role 
in the adjustment of most variables in the model but retains detail in the treatment of 
technologies characteristic of bottom-up models. The dynamics of the model is given by a 
recursive simulation process that simulates energy demand, supply and prices adjustments 
(Criqui et al. 1996). Marginal abatement cost curves for CO2 emissions reductions are assessed 
by the introduction of a carbon tax in all areas of fossil fuel energy use. This carbon tax leads to 
adjustments in the final energy demand within the model, through technological changes or 
implicit behavioral changes, and through replacements in energy conversion systems for which 
the technologies are explicitly defined in the model. The POLES model has been already used to 
analyze economic impacts of climate change policies and the consequences of implementing 
flexibility mechanisms (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2000; Criqui et al., 1999; Criqui and Viguier, 
2000a; Criqui and Viguier, 2000b, Criqui et al., 2000). 
The PRIMES (version 2) model is a partial equilibrium model of the European energy 
system and market developed by the Institute of Communication and Computer Systems of 
National Technical University of Athens (Capros and Mantzos, 1999). The model simulates the 
overall market equilibrium of the energy sector according to the mixed-complementary 
methodology, which roughly correspond to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of a mathematical 
programming problem. The current version of the model (version 2) formulated as a non-linear 
mixed complementarity (MCP) problem and solved under GAMS/CPLEX/PATH is calibrated 
on 1995 data set for all European Union Member States. It computes the prices of energy 
products that lead to the balancing of demand and supply of each energy product in a period of 
time (five year period). The model computes a static equilibrium each period, driven by 
exogenous assumptions about economic and population growth between periods. The imposition 
of carbon emissions constraint gives rise to a shadow price of carbon. The mechanism through 
which the energy system responds to the imposition of carbon constraints is that of changes in 
relative energy prices. These changes reflect the carbon content of each fuel and provide 
incentives to the economic agents to reduce their consumption of carbon. This model has been 
used to analyze macro-economic and sectoral effects of alternative climate policies for Europe 
(e.g., Capros et al., 2000; Capros and Mantzos, 2000). 
The World Energy Projection System (WEPS) is a partial equilibrium model of the world 
energy system developed by the US Energy Information Administration to provide a consistent, 
integrated, economic, and flexible accounting framework for analyzing and projecting trends in 
world energy markets (EIA, 1997). WEPS provides historical data and 2020 projections of 
energy consumption across the range of primary energy sources for major countries and regions 
worldwide (EIA, 2000). The WEPS accounting framework incorporates projections from 
independently documented models and assumptions about the future energy intensity of 
economic activity (ratios of total energy consumption divided by gross domestic product), and 
about the rate of incremental energy requirements met by natural gas, coal, and renewable energy 
sources (hydroelectricity, geothermal, solar, wind, biomass, and other renewable resources). Two 
independently documented models, the International Energy Module (IEM)a module of the 
National Energy Modeling System (NEMS)and the International Nuclear Model, PC Version 
(PC-INM) provide projections of oil and nuclear power consumption, respectively, which are 
incorporated into the WEPS model. 
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The GTEM model is a recursive dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy 
developed by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resources Economics (ABARE, 1996). 
Built on the GTAP database version 4.0e, GTEM includes 50 industries in 45 countries and 
regions. The regional coverage includes detail only for 5 EU countries: Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Unlike the other models consider in this study, the 
greenhouse gas coverage in GTEM is not limited to carbon dioxide  it include methane and 
nitrous oxide  and include removals by forest sinks. The GTEM model has been used to analyze 
the economic impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on different regions, such as developing countries 
and European countries (Brown et al., 1999; Polidano et al., 2000; Jotzo et al., 2000). 
 
 
4. THE REFERENCE CASE FOR EUROPE 
 
4.1. Assumptions and Reference Projections of EPPA-EU 
 
Costs estimates of climate change policies depend crucially on reference assumptions for 
economic growth, energy prices, the evolution of the electricity sector, and the resulting CO2 
emissions without any change in energy and environmental regulations. 
Technological growth in EPPA-EU is labor-augmented. The productivity parameter in 
EPPA-EU is adjusted such that the GDP growth rates during 1995-2000 approximate those 
estimated by IMF (2000). Table 2 displays our reference economic growth projections and IMF 
estimates of growth for 1995-2000. Real GDP growth rates are projected to be in the range of 
2.5%-2.9% through 2020 in Europe. These growth rates are lower than in the United States, but 
higher than in Japan. Economic growth is projected to be higher in Southern Europe (Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece) than in Northern Europe, except for Finland, Netherlands, and Sweden. 
 
 
Table 2. Real GDP Growth Rates, Reference scenario (%) 
IMF
1995       
-2000
1995       
-2010      
2010       
-2020      
DEU 1.7 2.4 2.5
DNK 2.4 3.0 3.1
ESP 3.6 3.8 4.0
FIN 4.9 4.1 4.3
FR 2.5 2.6 2.6
GBR 2.8 2.8 2.8
ITA 1.8 2.2 2.3
NLD 3.6 3.5 3.4
SWE 2.8 3.2 3.5
ROE 3.5 3.6 3.5
EEC 2.6 2.8 2.9
USA 4.3 3.4 3.4
JPN 1.1 1.9 2.3
Sources: IMF (2000), and EPPA-EU.
EPPA-EU
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Table 3 shows the main assumptions for energy prices in the European Union. Energy 
prices are projected to rise gradually over the period.  In EPPA, energy prices through 2010 are 
exogenously set in the reference case and then allowed to vary from this reference in response to 
climate policy. After 2010, prices in the reference and policy cases are endogenously determined 
by a long run resource model. Given the 5-year time step of the EPPA model, there is no attempt 
to represent processes that give rise to large short-run variability in energy prices. Coal prices 
increase at higher rates in Europe than in the United States or in Japan. On average, the increase 
of coal prices is projected to be lower than the increase of natural gas and oil prices between 
1995 and 2020 (except in Germany where the demand for coal remains very high). The increase 
of oil prices is higher than coal and natural gas prices during the whole period. 
 
Table 3. Reference Projections on Energy Prices 
(Average % Change Per Year) 
1995 
-2010
2010 
-2020
1995 
-2010
2010 
-2020
1995 
-2010
2010 
-2020
DEU 3.2 2.4 2.4 2.0 3.7 3.0
DNK 1.3 1.0 2.7 3.0 3.7 3.0
ESP 3.0 2.3 2.8 2.8 3.7 3.0
FIN 2.1 1.5 3.0 2.3 3.7 3.0
FR 2.0 1.3 2.8 2.5 3.7 3.0
GBR 2.9 2.1 2.7 3.0 3.7 3.0
ITA 3.0 2.1 2.9 2.7 3.7 3.0
NLD 1.6 1.2 2.7 3.0 3.7 3.0
SWE 1.6 1.2 2.8 2.3 3.7 3.0
ROE 2.3 1.6 3.2 2.7 3.7 3.0
USA 1.5 1.0 2.7 2.0 3.7 3.0
JPN 1.1 0.8 2.7 2.0 3.7 3.0
Coal Gas Oil
 
 
The share of various technologies in electricity generation is projected to remain largely 
unchanged from the 1995 base year through to 2020. For the EU as a whole, coal accounts for 
about 60 percent of fossil use used in electricity generation with gas and oil each accounting for 
approximately 20 percent. Among countries these shares vary but for each country shares 
through 2020 are not projected to change substantially in the reference. For example, coal 
accounts for nearly 80 percent of fossil fuel used in electricity in Germany and Denmark and 
between 65 and 70 percent in Spain and Great Britain and these shares are not projected to 
change substantially. Among EU countries, Italy was least dependent on coal (less than 10 
percent) in 1995 and most dependent on oil for electricity (greater than 60 percent), with little 
change in these shares through 2020. Gas as a share of fossil fuels used in the electric sector 
ranged from under 10 percent in Spain to over 25 percent in Great Britain and Italy in 1995, 
again with little change in these shares projected through 2020. Most other countries are not far 
from the EU average. Capital asset fixity and small changes in the relative prices of oil, gas, and, 
coal combine to give this result.  
Nuclear power generation is a separate sector in EPPA that includes a fixed factor input that 
can be used to limit expansion or force a contraction of the sector to reflect policy decisions 
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(Babiker, Reilly, Ellerman, 2000). The fixed factor growth was set to approximate the change in 
nuclear power production as in the EC projections shown in Table 4 (EC, 1999). The EC 
projections assume that it will be possible to extend the technical lifetime of old nuclear plants 
up to 40 years. It also assumed that EU countries without installed nuclear capacity in 1995 
would not invest in nuclear energy over the outlook period. This reference EC projection also 
takes into account the decommissioning schedules for nuclear power that have been recently 
decided at national level for Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, and Spain. The EC projections 
assumed that the agreement signed in Germany to retire 19 nuclear reactors by 2021 is 
progressively implemented from 2005. This set of projections differs from those of GTEM 
(Jotzo, 2000) that assumes that the share of nuclear power in electric generation is projected to 
be unchanged before 2020. 
 
Table 4. Forecasts for Nuclear Production,  
Reference Scenario (Average % Change Per Year) 
1995 
-2000
2000 
-2005
2005 
-2010
2010 
-2015
2015 
-2020
DEU 1.94 0.00 -0.23 -3.10 -6.62
DNK - - - - -
ESP 0.83 0.00 0.00 -0.41 -1.26
FIN 1.17 1.82 0.00 0.00 -0.35
FR 1.73 0.79 0.21 0.79 0.20
GBR 2.41 0.69 -0.61 -4.57 -1.93
ITA - - - - -
NLD 1.92 -3.93 -100 - -
SWE 0.22 -0.22 0.00 -3.45 -7.01
ROE 2.58 0.34 -0.34 0.00 -1.23
Source: European Commission, 1999  
 
 
4.2. Reference Projections for CO2 Emissions in EPPA-EU 
 
In the EPPA-EU model, CO2 emissions in EU countries are projected to reach 3.8 GtCO2 in 2010 
and 4.1 GtCO2 in 2020 in the reference case. On average, projected growth rates of emissions for 
Europe are lower than in the United States, but higher than in Japan (Table 5). Emissions are 
projected to increase by 1.07 per year between 1995 and 2010, slowing to 0.64 per year between 
2010 and 2020.Table 5 also shows significant differences among EU countries. Future emissions 
growth is slowest in the United Kingdom and Germany. Emissions growth rates in France are 
projected to be very closed to average growth rates in the European Union for the whole period. 
In contrast, reference emissions growth is projected to be very high in Spain, Finland and 
Sweden  
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Table 5. Projected CO2 Emissions Growth by Country, 
Reference Scenario (Average % Change Per Year) 
1995 
-2010
2010 
-2020
DEU 0.59 0.03
DNK 1.36 0.81
ESP 2.56 1.62
FIN 2.35 1.74
FR 1.17 0.67
GBR 0.54 0.11
ITA 0.45 0.61
NLD 1.65 0.58
SWE 2.44 1.40
ROE 1.58 1.34
EEC 1.07 0.64
USA 1.58 1.02
JPN 0.96 0.90  
 
The EPPA projections show relatively rapid growth in transportation and household 
emissions and slow growth in electric sector and industry emissions (Figure 1). As a result, 
households and transportation are projected to account for more than one-half of emissions in 
2020 in the EPPA reference case, up from 37 percent in 1995. The electric sector was the largest 
emitter in 1995 with 28 percent of total emissions and the transportation sector was the second 
largest accounting for 19 percent. The transportation sector remains the second largest emitting 
sector of the European economy in 2020 with 24 percent of total emissions. However, the 
household sector is the largest emitting sector in 2020 with 27 percent. The electricity sector falls 
to the third largest emitting sector. These trends are observed in all EU countries (except in 
Sweden where the share of transportation in national emissions decreases) although the specific 
sector shares in each country differ. 
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Figure 1. CO2 Emissions by Sector in Europe, 
Reference Scenario (% of Total Emissions) 
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4.3. Comparison of CO2 Projections 
 
Figures 2-7 show CO2 emissions trends from 1960 to 1995, and emissions projected by 
economic models to 2020. Estimations for CO2 emissions are based on OECD energy balances 
published by the International Energy Agency, and using the methodology of the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). To be able to compare emissions projections from different 
economic models, we apply projected emissions growth rates from our estimate of 1995 
emissions levels. 
The historical data show rapid growth of CO2 emissions in Japan compared to the United 
States and the European Union. Japans emissions quadrupled from 1960 to 1995 whereas the 
increase was 88 percent in the US and 56 percent in the EU. Historical trends also show the 
higher impact of the two oil shocks on the EU compared to Japan and the US. 
Emissions projections for the United States and Japan to 2010 and 2020 are similar in 
EPPA-EU, GTEM and the WEPS model of the DOE. POLES projects lower emissions growth 
rates compared to these models for the United States. For Europe, emissions growth rates are 
projected to be higher in EPPA-EU than in other models during the whole period. EPPA-EU 
combines both relatively high GDP growth and rapid reductions in energy use per dollar of GDP 
compared with the other models. Higher emissions in EPPA are thus due primarily to higher 
GDP growth rates for this region (the average GDP growth rate for Europe in EPPA-EU is 3.6 
percent between 1995 and 2010, 2.5 percent in POLES and PRIMES, and 2.7 percent in GTEM 
and WEPS).  
Figures 2-7 show greater differences among the models for individual EU countries than for 
the EU as a whole. There are substantial differences for Germany with little increase for GTEM 
and PRIMES while in POLES emissions are expected to decrease between 1995 and 2000, and 
to increase rapidly after this date. In EPPA-EU, emissions in Germany increase more rapidly in 
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early years and stabilize after 2005. These differences mean that emissions are 100 MtCO2 lower 
in POLES and PRIMES than in WEPS and EPPA-EU in 2010. Emission projections are 
comparable for 2010 in the United Kingdom, except in the WEPS model where the projection is 
surprisingly high. For France, emissions projections are similar in the different models 
considered in this study, especially for 2010 
 
Figures 2-7. CO2 Emissions, 1960-2020 (in MtCO2) 
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4.4. Decomposition of Emissions Intensities of GDP 
 
Comparable emission projections across economic models can result from different and 
offsetting assumptions. As noted above, EPPA-EU projects only slightly higher emissions 
despite GDP growth rates a percentage point higher than other models. To understand this result, 
a useful comparison is the carbon intensity of GDP, measuring the quantity of carbon emissions 
associated with one dollar of GDP. It can be decomposed in two effects: 1) the change in 
emissions intensity of energy consumption and 2) the evolution of energy intensity of GDP. 
These summary measures of an economys carbon emissions intensity can be constructed from 
readily available historical data or model output. Such a decomposition of emissions intensity of 
GDP provides a good basis to understand the relationship between emissions and economic 
growth in different economies, and to make inter-model comparisons. Carbon intensity of energy 
changes with the evolution of the fuel mix (e.g. coal to gas substitution), and with the structure of 
energy consumption in the economy. The origin of temporal and spatial disparities of energy 
intensity of GDP can vary due to the evolution of the economic system, the structure and the 
efficiency of the energy system, the GDP structure, technology and varied socio-economic 
behaviors.  
To make this comparison, we use a graphic approach already used in Viguier (1999). We 
convert GDP for all countries into 1990 US dollars using the 1990 exchange rates.4 Projections 
from all the models are normalized to actual 1995 data to preserve the forecasted trends. In 
Figures 8-12, the x-axis is the energy intensity of GDP and the y-axis is the emission intensity of 
energy. Light curves are isoquants for a given (constant) carbon intensity of GDP. Each point on 
one of these curves gives a combination of emission intensity of energy and energy intensity of 
GDP that results in the same level of emission intensity of GDP; i.e. an economy can achieve a 
                                                 
4 Comparisons across countries in the absolute levels of emissions intensity and energy intensity per unit of GDP 
depend on the conversion of GDP from home currency to a common currency.  Exchange rate variations can be 
fairly large (e.g. the recent decline of the EURO) and thus the base year exchange rate chosen can have a significant 
effect. The time path is not affected by exchange rate variation. 
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given level of emissions per dollar of GDP with a high level of energy efficiency using a 
relatively carbon intensive mix of fuels or with a lower level of energy efficiency combined with 
mix of fuels with a relatively low carbon intensity. These graphs include a decomposition of 
emission intensities observed between 1960 and 1995, and a decomposition of emission 
intensities projected in the different economic models until 2020. 
We show in Figures 8-12 the isoquants of carbon intensity of GDP corresponding to the 
Kyoto commitment if we assume GDP growth in the EPPA-EU reference (see Table 2). These 
curves apply only to 2010 and to the other models only if GDP growth was that found in EPPA 
and that rate of growth of GDP applied to these models did not affect emissions intensity. In 
reality, if higher GDP growth were actually imposed in these models, one would expect higher 
energy prices and as a result somewhat greater energy-efficiency and a shift in fuel mix. Further 
economic growth beyond 2010 would require further reduction in energy intensity in all of the 
projections if the Kyoto target emissions levels were to be maintained. 
Figure 8 shows that the reduction of the carbon intensity of US GDP has been mostly due to 
the reduction of energy intensity. The data, based on 1990 exchange rates, show the carbon 
intensity of GDP for the US economy to have been around fifty percent higher than in Europe at 
the beginning of the sixties, and the gap has increased from 1960 to 1995.  Most of the gain in 
emissions intensity of GDP in the US has been due to energy efficiency gains with little change 
in the carbon intensity of fuels. This tendency is projected to continue in the EPPA-EU model 
until 2020. In POLES and WEPS, the reduction of energy intensity is projected to be more 
limited, and the carbon intensity of energy consumption is projected to increase in the future, the 
consequence of rising coal consumption. In Europe, both the decline of energy intensity and the 
positive evolution of the fuel mix are responsible for a falling emissions intensity of GDP for the 
1960 to 1995 period. EPPA-EU projects a slight reduction of carbon intensity of GDP in Europe 
due mainly to the decrease of energy intensity. Projections are similar across economic models 
for 2010, although PRIMES and POLES project a larger reduction of carbon intensity of energy. 
Based on EPPA-EU growth rate assumptions, the European Union is closer to the level of carbon 
intensity that would meet the Kyoto target in 2010 than is the United States. 
In Japan, the historical trend in carbon intensity of GDP has three distinct periods (Figure 
9). From 1960 to 1974, carbon intensity of GDP rises because the increase of energy intensity 
outweighs the decline of carbon intensity of energy consumption. From 1974 to 1989, both 
emissions intensity of energy and energy intensity of the economy contribute to a decline in the 
carbon intensity of GDP. After 1989, the emission intensity of GDP of the Japanese economy 
rose. From 1990 to 1992 the increase is due to a fuel mix effect and from 1991 to 1995 a growth 
of energy intensity also contributes to the rise in emissions intensity of GDP. The EPPA-EU 
model projects a larger reduction of carbon intensity than the other models between 1995 and 
2020 due to a higher decrease of energy intensity in this country. As in the United States, the 
reduction of carbon intensity in 2010 in the reference case plotted here only one-half that needed 
to meet the Kyoto commitment.  
We also plot separately the three largest EU economies, showing that the pattern over time 
is not uniform across the EU. Frances aggressive nuclear program explains most of its decline of 
carbon intensity of GDP observed in the past (Figure 10). An important part of this trend is the 
accounting of primary electricity in fossil fuel equivalent terms, the convention adopted by IEA 
 17
and used widely. As a result, the level of carbon intensity reached in 1995 is one of the lowest 
among developed economies but France shows little improvement in energy efficiency. Nuclear 
power is not expected to increase substantially in the future under any of the model forecasts.  
All show a pattern of energy efficiency improvements rather than fuel mix changes that is similar 
to the evolution projected for other economies. Emissions projections for France through 2010 
are comparable in EPPA-EU, WEPS, and PRIMES.  
In Germany, carbon intensity of GDP has decreased substantially between 1960 and 1995 
due to the combined effect of the fuel mix and energy efficiency (Figure 11). The trend is 
expected to continue in this country in the different economic models. The decline of carbon 
intensity of fuels is more important in the sectoral models (POLES and PRIMES) than in EPPA-
EU and WEPS. Contrary to most of other Annex B countries, Germany is projected to nearly 
achieve a level of carbon intensity of GDP in 2010 that would allow it to meet the Kyoto target 
under the reference projection even assuming the rapid GDP growth assumptions of EPPA-EU.  
In the United Kingdom, carbon intensity has declined since 1974 mainly in consequence of 
energy efficiency improvements (Figure 12). The carbon intensity of GDP declined at an 
average rate of 2% per year between 1974 and 1995. The EPPA-EU model projections are for an 
average decline in this ratio of 2.4% per year between 1995 and 2020, considerably more rapid 
than in other models. The other three models project a greater decline in the carbon intensity of 
energy consumption through 2010. 
All projections for each of these countries show a decline of emissions intensity of GDP 
continuing through 2020. Historically a decline in the carbon intensity of fuels has been an 
important contributor to the decline in carbon intensity of GDP for the EU. None of the 
projections expect a decline in carbon intensity of fuels similar to the historical rate to continue 
through 2020. The EPPA-EU projections show little further reduction in emissions intensity of 
fuels after 1995. The other model project some decline through 2010 but then increasing 
emissions intensity of fuels. The EPPA-EU projections are somewhat more optimistic than the 
other models about the capacity of the EU countries, Japan, and the US to improve energy 
efficiency in the business-as-usual scenario. 
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Figures 8-12. Decomposition of Emissions Intensities of GDP, 1960-2020 
1960
1995
1960
1995
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.7
2.9
3.1
3.3
3.5
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
Energy intensity of output  (toe/ 1000 US$90)
Em
is
si
on
s 
in
te
ns
ity
 o
f e
ne
rg
y 
(tC
O
2/
 to
e)
UNITED 
STATES
EUROPEAN 
UNION
EPPA
EPPA
PRIMES
POLES
POLES
WEPS
1 kg CO2/ USD
0.8 kg CO2/ USD
0.6 kg CO2/ USD0.4 kg CO2/ USD
1.2 kg CO2/ USD
0.2 kg CO2/ USD
2010
2010
Kyoto target (EU) Kyoto target (USA)
 
 
1960
1995
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.7
2.9
3.1
3.3
3.5
0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24
Energy intensity of output (toe/ 1000 US$90)
Em
is
si
on
s 
in
te
ns
ity
 o
f e
ne
rg
y 
(tC
O
2/
 to
e)
JAPAN
EPPA
POLES
WEPS
0.8 kg CO2/ USD
0.6 kg CO2/ USD
0.4 kg CO2/ USD
0.2 kg CO2/ USD
2010
Kyoto target
 
 
 19
1960
1995
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24
Energy intensity of output (toe/ 1000 US$90)
Em
is
si
on
s 
in
te
ns
ity
 o
f e
ne
rg
y 
(tC
O
2/
 to
e)
FRANCE
EPPA
POLES
PRIMES
WEPS
0.4 kg CO2/ USD
0.6 kg CO2/ USD
0.8 kg CO2/ USD
0.2 kg CO2/ USD
Kyoto target
2010
 
 
1960
1995
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
Energy intensity of output (toe/ 1000 US$90)
Em
is
si
on
s 
in
te
ns
ity
 o
f e
ne
rg
y 
(tC
O
2/
 to
e) GERMANY
EPPA
PRIMES
WEPS
0.4 kg CO2/ USD 0.6 kg CO2/ USD
0.8 kg CO2/ USD
1 kg CO2/ USD
POLES
0.2 kg CO2/ USD
Kyoto target
2010
 
 
 20
1960
1995
2.5
2.7
2.9
3.1
3.3
3.5
3.7
3.9
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
Energy intensity of output (toe/ 1000 US$90)
Em
is
si
on
s 
in
te
ns
ity
 o
f e
ne
rg
y 
(tC
O
2/
 to
e)
UNITED KINGDOM
POLES
PRIMES
WEPS
0.4 kg CO2/ USD 0.6 kg CO2/ USD 0.8 kg CO2/ USD 1 kg CO2/ USD
EPPA
2010
Kyoto target
 
 
 
5. EMISSIONS ABATEMENT COST AND CLIMATE POLICIES 
 
5.1. Reference Emissions Projections and Burden sharing Agreement 
 
The EU has developed differentiated targets for each member country in order to share 
equitably the economic burden of climate protection. Differentiated obligations in the climate 
policy area were designed to reflect opportunities and constraints that vary from one country to 
another. Under the Kyoto Protocol the European Union agreed to a target reduction in GHG 
emissions of 8 percent below 1990 levels for the 2008-2012 period. While targets were specified 
for each EU country in the protocol, it allowed the development of an alternative burden-sharing 
scheme to be developed by the EU as long as the aggregate 8 percent target was met. 
Table 6 shows the Burden Sharing Agreement adopted at the environmental Council 
meeting by Member States, on June 1998. This agreement evolved from previous targets based 
on earlier climate policy negotiations and those leading up to the Kyoto protocol. In the earliest 
proposed reductions (column one of Table 6) there was a common understanding among 
Member States that lesser burdens should fall on cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
and Spain) relative to other Member States to take into account their need for economic 
development (Ringius, 1997). Two alternative sets of targets were developed soon after. A 
differentiation scheme designed by the EC under the Dutch Presidency was largely based on a 
sectoral allocation scheme, known as the Triptique approach, developed by Dutch experts. It is 
shown in column two of Table 6 (Blok and Phylipsen, 1996). A 15 percent overall reduction, it 
was slightly less aggressive than the 17 percent reduction originally proposed by the Dutch 
experts in January 1997. It had the principal effect of further easing the burden for the cohesion 
countries. During this same period, a meeting of the EC Ad Hoc Group on Climate generated a 
set of pledged reductions from each member state.  The basic burden-sharing pattern was similar 
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to that in the Dutch proposal except that many countries were unable to pledge to cuts as deep as 
those envisioned in the Dutch proposal. The pledged reductions resulted in an EC target for 2010 
of approximately 10 percent rather than 15 percent (column 3 of Table 6). The post-Kyoto 
agreement allowed a further relaxation of the burden for several countries. 
 
 
Table 6. Comparison Between the “Triptique” Approach, the Dutch Proposal, 
Member States’ Informal Targets, and the Burden Sharing Agreement for 2010 (1990 = 100) 
The Triptique 
Approach, 
Variant IIA 
(16-17 Jan 1997)
Dutch 
Presidency 
Proposal 
(27 Jan 1997)
Informal Pledge 
from Member States 
at Ad Hoc Group 
meeting (Feb 1997)
Burden 
Sharing 
Agreement 
(June 1998)
AU 75 75 75 87.0
BEL 85 85 90 92.5
DEU 70 70 75 79.0
DNK 75 75 75 79.0
ESP 106 115 115 115.0
FIN 93 90 95 100.0
FR 88 95 95 100.0
GBR 80 80 90 87.5
GR 98 105 110 125.0
IR 95 105 110 113.0
ITA 91 90 95 93.5
LUX 80 60 70 72.0
NLD 91 90 90 94.0
PO 116 125 125 127.0
SWE 105 105 105 104.0
EEC 83 85 90 92.0
Sources: Blok et al ., 1997; Ringius, 1997.  
 
Table 7 compares the proposed reduction with actual changes in emissions through 1998 
and EPPA projections through 2010. For the EU as a whole there was a slight increase in 
emissions from 1990 through 1998. The EPPA-EU reference forecast is for a further increase 
through 2010 with an increase to 14% above 1990 levels instead of a reduction of 8%.  
Emission trends in Member States vary widely from average figures. Emissions in Germany 
and the UK were lower in 1998 than in 1990 by a substantial amount. In Germany, the 
unification process, eliminating many inefficient fossil fuel using industrial plants, is credited 
with the reduction. In the UK, the switch from coal to gas in the electricity sector has led to 
emissions reductions in the first half of the 1990s. Other EU countries suffered economic 
recessions in the early 1990s (Sweden, Finland, Netherlands) and as a result showed very little 
emissions growth through 1998. EPPA forecasts for these regions show much more rapid 
increases through 2010 because GDP is projected to grow rapidly. Most other Member States 
have found that by 1998 emissions increased substantially from 1990 levels. EPPA forecasts a 
similar rate of increase through 2010. 
Table 7 also shows that the effort rate imposed by the Kyoto protocol, in terms of 
emission reductions from the reference projection, would be close to 20% for the European 
Community. However, effort rates vary greatly from one member States to another given the 
burden sharing agreement. According to the EPPA-EU reference case, Denmark, Netherlands, 
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and Finland would make the highest effort. At the opposite, the burden imposed on the UK, Italy, 
and Germany would be rather limited. 
 
Table 7. CO2 Emission Reference and Kyoto Targets 
Emissions 
between 
1990-1998a
Emission 
baseline 
1990-2010
Kyoto 
target in 
2010
Reduction 
from the 
baseline
% % % of 1990 % of 2010
DEU -12.7% -3.9% -21.0% 17.8
DNK 12.8% 39.7% -21.0% 43.4
ESP 19.4% 57.9% 15.0% 27.2
FIN 6.5% 45.9% 0.0% 31.5
FR 8.0% 19.1% 0.0% 16.0
GBR -6.2% 0.8% -12.5% 12.7
ITA 8.0% 8.0% -6.5% 13.0
NLD 11.2% 40.6% -6.0% 33.1
SWE 2.7% 50.7% 4.0% 31.0
ROE 13.6% 32.9% 5.0% 21.0
EEC 0.4% 14.3% -8.0% 19.7
USA 10.8% 34.4% -7.0% 30.8
JPN 16.7% 39.3% -6.0% 32.5
Sources: aUNFCCC, 2000; EPPA model  
 
 
5.2. Emissions Abatement Costs in Europe 
 
A useful way to characterize the response of a model to emissions controls is to plot 
marginal abatement curves. Such curves are derived by setting progressively tighter abatement 
levels and recording the resulting shadow price of carbon or by introducing progressively higher 
carbon taxes and recording the quantity of abated emissions. The EPPA relationship between the 
carbon shadow price and abated emissions is a model output that is most directly comparable to 
the POLES and PRIMES sector models. We generate a marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve 
for each Member State using the EPPA-EU model in this section and compare these to marginal 
abatement curves from the PRIMES and POLES models. We use the emissions targets from the 
EU burden sharing agreement to show graphically the differences in carbon prices estimates for 
different models. Two parameters explain differences: 1) 2010 emissions in the reference 
scenario which, together with the emissions target, determines the required abatement level, and 
2) differences in MAC curves slopes. 
As explained by Ellerman & Decaux (1998), a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model can produce a shadow price for any constraint on carbon emissions for a given region R 
at time T. A MAC curve plots the shadow prices corresponding to different level of emissions 
reduction. MAC curves are upward-sloping curve: the shadow price of emissions reduction rise 
as an increasing function of emissions reduction. 
In a CGE model it is convenient to place a quantity constraint on emissions and solve for the 
shadow price of the constraint. The shadow price is the marginal value of the constraint, 
equivalent to the carbon tax rate needed to achieve the reduction assuming revenues of the tax 
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are distributed in a lump sum. In a partial equilibrium model (e.g. POLES and PRIMES), the 
constraint is set by the introduction of a carbon tax, and emissions reductions are the output of 
the model (Criqui et al., 1999). Abatement costs in the general equilibrium model explicitly take 
into account macroeconomic feedbacks and effects of climate change policies such as changes in 
income or trade that are not explicitly included in the PRIMES and POLES models.   
 
Figure 13. Marginal Abatement Curves for the United States, European Union, and Japan 
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Figure 13 shows MAC curves for the United States, Japan, and the European Union5 
estimated in EPPA-EU. They have been plotted as a function of the percentages of carbon 
emission reduction below 2010 reference emissions in order to make regions comparable. We 
suppose that all Annex B countries have the same emission target in percentage of reduction 
from emissions levels in 1990, and that non-Annex B regions do not implement emissions 
reduction policies.  
We can see that the marginal cost of reducing carbon emissions by a given percentage is 
lower in the United States than in Europe and Japan. For example, the shadow price 
corresponding to 20% abatement below reference emissions in 2010 is 140 dollars in the US, 160 
in the European Union, and 200 in Japan. Compared to the European Union and Japan, the 
United States have a great potential of low cost reductions linked to fuel switching in electricity 
generation, changes in processes in energy-intensive industries, and emission control in the 
transportation sector. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The EU aggregate is derived by aggregating individual abatement curves. 
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Figure 14. Marginal Abatement Cost Curves from EPPA-EU, The European Union 
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In Figure 14, we can see the dispersion of MAC curves across European countries in the 
EPPA model. On one side, Spain and Finland are expected to have a large potential of low cost 
abatements, compared for example to France and the United Kingdom. Germany has low 
abatement costs as long as emission reductions are below 20% of the reference emissions 
projections in 2010. In this country, emissions reduction can still be made at low cost in the 
electricity sector heavily relied on coal. On the other side, the slope of Italys MAC curve is 
expected to be very high due to the structure of the economy  the weight of electricity 
generation and energy-intensive industries in total emissions is already very low.  
 
 
Figure 15. Marginal Abatement Curves for the United States, European Union, and Japan 
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Figure 15 shows the MAC curves for the EU, USA, and Japan for the EPPA-EU and for the 
POLES and PRIMES models. PRIMES is a model of only Europe. We also show the required 
abatement and resulting carbon price for each region given the reference emissions projection 
from each model and the Kyoto target assuming no emissions trading among these regions. 
Marginal abatement cost of meeting the Kyoto target in major Annex B regions without trading 
differ across economic models because of variations in 1) reference emission projections, and 2) 
MAC curves estimations6. For example, the shadow price of Kyoto is expected to be higher in 
EPPA-EU than in POLES for the United States not because of emission references, but because 
the MAC curve is higher. The MAC of Kyoto in Japan also differs between EPPA-EU and 
POLES as a result of MAC curve slopes. Finally, MAC curves are very similar in POLES and 
PRIMES for the European Union. However, the emission reference is higher in POLES than in 
PRIMES so that the carbon price for this region is greater in POLES. The European MAC curve 
is lower in EPPA-EU than in other models, but emissions are higher in the reference scenario. As 
a result, the EU carbon price in EPPA-EU falls between that in the two sector models. 
 
Figure 16. Marginal Abatement Curves for Germany 
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6 Originally, MAC curves are expressed in dollars of 1995 in EPPA, in dollars of 1990 in POLES and in EURO of 
1990 in PRIMES. We use exchange rates given by the IMF to convert abatement costs in 1995USD. 
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Figure 17. Marginal Abatement Curves for France 
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Figure 18. Marginal Abatement Curves for the United Kingdom 
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In Figures 16, 17, and 18, we can see that, in general, MAC curves are lower in EPPA-EU 
than in partial equilibrium models of the energy system. One source of difference is that EPPA is 
a general equilibrium model taking into account trade and income effects is one source of this 
difference. POLES and PRIMES, as sectoral models, consider only the adjustments achieved in 
the energy system. This effect EPPA-EU tends to lower the carbon price required to meet the 
Kyoto target compared with POLES and PRIMES. Offsetting this effect is the fact that reference 
emissions in EPPA-EU are projected to be higher in 2010 than in POLES and PRIMES, mainly 
as a result of assumptions on GDP growth rate during this period. As a result, shadow prices 
estimations vary across economic models from one European country to another depending on 
the importance of these two opposite effects.  
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Table 8. Domestic carbon Prices, no trade case 
EPPA GTEM POLES PRIMES
US$95/ tC US$95/ tC US$95/ tC US$95/ tC
GBR 91 113 133 123
DEU 119 177 107 88
FR 136 - 220 144
ITA 147 - 352 173
ROE 160 - - 221
ESP 184 - - 134
FIN 217 289 - 150
NLD 293 - - 536
SWE 310 358 - 219
DNK 385 400 - 189
EEC 159 155 188 135
USA 229 - 177 -
JPN 201 - 238 -  
 
 
Table 8 compares the estimations of domestic carbon prices in EPPA-EU, GTEM, POLES, 
and PRIMES. The estimated carbon price for the European Union as a whole is quite similar in 
the two CGE models and is between the estimates for POLES and PRIMES. All models show 
quite wide difference in carbon prices across EU countries given the burden sharing agreement.  
In EPPA-EU and GTEM, the United Kingdom and Germany are expected to have the lowest 
carbon prices while Scandinavian countries are projected to have the highest marginal abatement 
cost. Contrary to CGE models, PRIMES and POLES expect shadow prices to be lower in 
Germany than in the United Kingdom. The 2010 reference emissions forecasts for Germany vary 
greatly across economic models. 
 
 
5.3. Welfare Costs and Competitiveness Effects 
 
In EPPA-EU, the total cost of Kyoto commitment is measured in terms of welfare costs 
measured in equivalent variation. Welfare cost is a popular measure of costs for economists 
because it measures the amount of extra income consumers would need to compensate them for 
the losses caused by the policy change. As shown by Babiker and Jacoby (1999), welfare losses 
for the OECD countries are generally less than GNP losses. One factor that contributes to this is 
the favorable movement in their terms of trade. These countries import energy, whose price 
declines thus improving their terms of trade. 
Table 9 shows the decomposition of the economic effects of meeting Kyoto without 
international emissions trading, expressed as percentage changes for year 2010 compared to the 
reference scenario. We see that, in EPPA-EU, Kyoto targets are projected to yield welfare losses 
across European countries in the range of 0.6 to 5%. Terms of trade improve for most EU 
countries, the exceptions being the UK and Denmark. The United Kingdom is projected to have 
a deterioration of its terms of trade because it is an oil exporter. In Denmark, the adverse effect 
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of the emissions constraint on terms of trade is explained by the very low share of fuels and 
energy-intensive goods in total imports (one-half the EU average). 
There is a general correspondence between measures of carbon price, loss of welfare, and 
loss of GNP for these regions, i.e. those countries projected to have low carbon prices also have 
small welfare and small GNP effects. This correspondence is, however, not exact. Frances 
carbon price is moderately higher than Germany and the UK but it welfare and GNP losses are 
among the lowest. Similarly, the US and Japan have high carbon prices but low welfare and GNP 
effects. Emissions intensity of GDP, the terms of trade effect, and the shape of the abatement 
curve (i.e. substitution possibilities) all contribute to these differences. 
 
Table 9. Decomposition of the Economic 
Effects of Meeting Kyoto Without Trading (% change) 
Welfare GNP
Terms of 
trade
DEU -0.63 -1.17 1.10
FR -0.67 -1.11 1.11
UK -0.96 -1.14 -0.77
ITA -1.01 -1.47 1.54
ROE -1.23 -2.12 1.07
FIN -1.90 -2.73 1.67
ESP -2.83 -4.76 2.06
SWE -3.47 -5.11 1.18
DNK -3.97 -5.72 -0.74
NLD -4.92 -7.19 0.55
USA -0.49 -1.01 2.39
JPN -0.22 -0.49 2.70  
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Our analysis confirms that carbon emissions would increase in European countries if no new 
policy were implemented. In this new version of the EPPA-EU model, European emissions are 
expected to rise by 14% in 2010 compared to the 1990 level, instead of decrease by the 8% 
required to meet the Kyoto protocol target. The share of electricity generation in total emission is 
projected to decline over time in Europe at the expense of the transportation sector and the 
households sector. These results make clear that additional climate policies will need to be 
implemented in Europe to reach the Kyoto commitment. According to projected emissions 
growth in the reference scenario, the task would be difficult for Northern European countries 
such as Denmark, Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. At the opposite, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Italy could reach more easily their emissions targets. Based on EPPA-EU 
forecasts and those of other models, the Burden Sharing Agreement designed in part to 
differentiate among countries based on prospective emissions growth, leaves still large 
differences in the require effort of EU countries. This is true whether effort is measured in terms 
of the percentage reduction in emissions from reference, the carbon price needed to meet the 
reduction, or the impact on GDP or welfare.  
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In our comparison among models, our analysis shows that similar emissions projections 
across economic models can result from various assumptions about the evolution of carbon 
intensity of the economy. In the reference scenario, carbon intensity of GDP is expected to 
decline over time due to the reduction of carbon emissions of energy and to the decrease of 
energy intensity resulting from technological change and structural change in the economy. Our 
inter-model comparison shows in reference projections that, in general, EPPA-EU shows greater 
improvements in energy efficiency than the sectoral models (POLES and PRIMES) but more 
limited reductions in carbon emissions due to changes in the composition of energy 
consumption. 
We also find differences across countries in marginal abatement cost curves that are due to 
the differences in the structure of the economies, particularly reflecting differences in the 
electricity sector. These differences contribute to differences in estimates of the domestic carbon 
prices needed to meet the Kyoto protocol. In general, emissions reductions required to achieve 
the targets set out in the protocol are higher in EPPA-EU than in POLES and PRIMES, but MAC 
curves are lower. In EPPA-EU, just as in other models, Germany is expected to have more 
flexibility to reduce its emissions than, for example, France or Italy. The widely varying 
abatement costs are indicative of the potential for emissions trading within the EU to reduce the 
costs of meeting the Kyoto commitment. 
Welfare cost of meeting the Kyoto target without trading was projected to vary across 
European countries from 0.6 to 5%. This change in welfare from the reference scenario is the 
result of GNP losses and terms of trade movements. In most of EU countries, the adverse effect 
of the emission constraint on GNP is reduced by a favorable effect on international 
competitiveness. However, this positive impact of climate policy on comparative advantage can 
differ substantially from one European country to another depending on the structure of 
international trade, and particularly on the weight of fuels and energy-intensive goods in total 
imports. Terms of trade are expected to increase significantly in Finland and Spain, but to 
deteriorate in the United Kingdom and in Denmark. 
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